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Lang: The Nature and Potential of the Saskatchewan Insurance Experiment

THE NATURE AND POTENTIAL OF THE
SASKATCHEWAN INSURANCE EXPERIMENT
0. E. LANG*
It is commonplace for writers in the automobile injuries field to
describe opposing approaches to the tort questions involved as either
liability or compensation oriented. This clear division by label has
unfortunate undertones, since it is truly impossible either to discuss
liability intelligently while ignoring compensation or to discuss compensation without regard to liability. Those individuals who have
a special interest in an automobile insurance plan such as the one in
effect in Saskatchewan must take pains to resist not only the suggestion
that they are mindful of compensation alone but also the accompany-

ing implication and accusation that questions of liability do not concern them or are ignored by them.
There is little doubt that the early supporters of the Saskatchewan
solution of the automobile injuries problem had many and varied
reasons for attempting to institute such a scheme. Many of those reasons were intensely practical and did not consider carefully plotted
theory with respect to either liability or compensation. Certain aspects
of the obtainable results appealed to these men as solutions of particular problems that specially concerned them. Thus it would actually
be possible to find contradictory objectives pursued in a common manner because of misunderstandings or differences of opinion as to what
should be the end result of the means employed. It is also true that
men like John Green, who is still intimately connected with the operation of the Saskatchewan scheme, had a well-considered theory in regard to the plan - a theory agreeing in large measure with the famous
Columbia Report.1 Even if this were not so, it would be inevitable
that theories would evolve in the course of the plan's later operation
in order to gauge its performance better and to determine the route
of development. Confusion about the scheme's theory and objectives
has been magnified somewhat because of the coexistence within the
scheme itself of three rather distinct approaches to the problem. In
a sense, as will be shown more clearly later, only a portion of the
scheme follows the theory that has made it most famous. How far
this portion should be expanded at the expense of opposing approaches is, of course, a live issue in Saskatchewan today. It is also
-B.A., LL.B. 1953, University of Saskatchewan; B.C.L. 1955, Oxford University;
Acting Dean, College of Law, University of Saskatchewan; member of Saskatchewan,
Canada, Bar.
1. Report by the Committee to Study Compensation for Automobile Accidents
to the Columbia University Council for Research in the Social Sciences (1932).
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an important question whether Saskatchewan may serve to demonstrate more fully to other jurisdictions how effectively and beneficially
liability and compensation problems may be solved.
At the heart of the Saskatchewan operation is a government-owned
corporation, the Saskatchewan Government Insurance Office, popularly called SGIO. This office competes in many fields of the insurance
business, but these activities are secondary to its operation with respect to automobile insurance.
The involvement of SGIO in the automobile injury field can best
be understood by breaking it down into three categories: low level
universal coverage without regard to fault, medium compulsory and
monopoly coverage using standard liability, and unlimited competitive
extension coverage. The most famous category is that provided for in
Part II of the Automobile Accident Insurance Act. 2 In this part,
statutory liability is imposed upon SGIO, which must compensate
persons injured or the dependents or next-of-kin of those killed as
the result of the operation of a motor vehicle in Saskatchewan as well
as Saskatchewan residents injured while riding in Saskatchewanregistered vehicles in the United States or Canada.
The most important characteristic of this statutory compensation
is that no question is asked as to the manner in which the accident
occurred. This is a clear application of a theory of strict liability,
since those active in operating and owning automobiles contribute to
the fund, which pays for the resulting harm without raising the standard question of fault in tort law. This is compulsory insurance combined with strict liability, and the inelegance with which the premiums are assessed does not justify an allegation that the question of
liability is being ignored. Liability is attached to activity in accordance
with the theory of strict liability.
A second distinctive feature of statutory compensation is a complete disregard for the income or status of the person killed or injured. Thus the payment for any person leaving a primary dependent is $5,000 plus $1,000 for every secondary dependent up to a maximum of $10,000. The death of an adult without dependents entitles
his parents to a division of $1,000. The payment for a child under
fifteen years of age is graduated upwards from $100 for a child under
seven years old, with an added $100 for each additional year of age.
Weekly indemnities of $25 may be provided for temporary disability for a maximum of 104 weeks.3 There is a schedule of payments
for permanent disability; $4,000 is the payment for total disability,
and lesser amounts are provided for partial disability according to
2. REV. STAT. SASK. ch. 371 (1953) and amendments.
3. REv. STAT. SASK. ch. 371, §21 (1953), as amended, STAT. SASK. -ch. 3, §21 (2)
(1958).
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its severity. A short excerpt from the 1960 schedule will illustrate
the approach.4
CLASS I - SHOULDER AND FOREARM.

Disability
Shoulder:

Degree of Impairment of:
Upper
Whole
Extremity
Body

1. Amputation:
(a) disarticulation at shoulder
(or loss above deltoid insertion)
(b) between shoulder and elbow
(c) below elbow, or loss of entire hand

100%
100%
80%

85%
50%
40%

80%
60%

40%
30%

35%

16%

16%

8%

60%

30%

20%

10%

36%

18%

18%

9%

80%

40%

60%
35%

30%
15%

40%
20%

20%
10%
15%

2. Limitation of motion:
(a) total ankylosis (arm at side):
scapula fixed
scapula free
(b) partial ankylosis:
(i) scapula free: - active painless motion to(A) 250 abduction and rotation,
500 flexion and extension
(B) 900 abduction and rotation,
full flexion and extension
(it) scapula fixed: - painless motion to:
(A) 250 abduction and rotation,
500 flexion and extension
(B) 900 abduction and rotation,
full flexion and extension
3. Recurrent dislocation (shoulder):
(a) without operation
(b) with operation and residual partial
ankylosis not exceeding that
mentioned in item 2 (b) (i) (B)
4. Flail shoulder
Elbow:
Limitation of motion:
1. Total ankylosis:
(a) full extension
(b) 900 angle
2. Partial ankylosis:
(a) 1800 to 1350 flexion
(b) 1600 to 900 flexion
(c) 900 to 450 flexion

30%

4. Rav. STAT. SASK. ch. 371, §20 (1953), as amended, STAT. SASK. ch. 15, §20(5)
(1960).
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The second involvement of SGIO in automobile insurance differs
greatly from the first. It is a simple compulsory insurance for damage
to one's own vehicle and for property damage and public liability up
to certain common medium-range maximums, including several deductibles at the lower ranges. The feature that makes the Saskatchewan approach distinct from that employed in other jurisdictions in
which compulsory insurance has been adopted is the additional requirement that this insurance be effected with SGIO. The Saskatchewan Government Insurance Office is, therefore, a monopoly insurer in this major area of automobile insurance. Its potential liability
is reduced by any amounts that may be paid by it under Part II of
the act in the pattern previously outlined. The obligation to compensate an insured for damage to his own vehicle is straightforward
insurance involving no question of his liability. In so far, however,
as property damage and public liability are concerned, the principles
of liability from tort law are retained. The SGIO is liable only to the
extent that its insured are liable.
The monopoly feature eliminates some disputes that might otherwise arise among parties or their respective insurers. This is true as
to the vehicle itself, since the same company insures the owner's possible loss as well as the liability of anyone who is at fault in regard
to the vehicle. In regard to personal injuries, the liability and fault
problems of the tort law are allowed to inflict themselves upon claimants and raise especially difficult and undesirable problems when the
insurance office shields itself behind the shelter given to actors against
gratuitous passengers. Insurance for this group is so desirable, and
could be obtained so cheaply if included in an owner's premium,
that owners would usually be glad to pay for it.
Because of its monopolistic position, SGIO is liable for hit-and-run
drivers and operators of stolen cars, subject only to rights of subrogation against the drivers.
The Saskatchewan act underwent some changes until the deductible was eventually fixed at 5200 for one's own automobile, but it
was removed in the case of property damage liability. Accordingly, at
the lower level, fault is only a question of determining who should
bear the $200 portion or how it should be shared among several
drivers. The upper limits in this compulsory monopoly insurance are
fairly standard medium limits. The maximum recovery is $10,000 for
injury to one person, $20,000 for injuries in one accident, and $5,000
for property damage. Drivers are permitted to insure themselves for
higher amounts if they so desire, and the insurance companies are
in open competition for this business.
The premiums both for Part II coverage and for the second category of comprehensive and public liability coverage are collected
together without any clear distinction. Each operator purchasing a
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license to drive in Saskatchewan pays an insurance premium of $2.00.
Each owner, when purchasing his annual registration certificate for
his vehicle, pays a premium ranging from $5.00 to $40.00, depending
on the wheel base and the age of his car. An operator who has been
guilty of certain offenses may find himself in a higher insurance
premium category when purchasing his license. Except for this category, the insurance premium is the same for all. Because the insurance is automatic with the issuance of either the license or the
registration certificate, there are great savings in the costs of writing
this insurance. There is no special form of insurance policy. Both
the registration certificate and the operator's certificate indicate that
insurance is included, and thereafter the act is the insurance policy.
The insurance office pays to the Highway Traffic Board, the provincial vehicle licensing and control authority, an appropriate proportion of the costs of issuing and selling the certificates of registration. When an agent is employed to sell these certificates, his commission from the insurance office is ten cents per policy. The simplicity
of the operation and the turnover make this sufficient compensation.
The third category of involvement of SGIO in automobile insurance is in the purely competitive field of extension insurance beyond
that which is compulsory and automatic under the act. In this category the Saskatchewan position is the same as that of most jurisdictions in North America. The insurance is completely voluntary, and
there is full competition in the free enterprise sense. This may be
subject to some important qualifications as a result of SGIO's
favorable position through its contracts in handling the other basic
types of insurance under Part II and the comprehensive and liability
category, the publicity it receives, its rate leadership, and its novel
experiment. At the present time approximately fifty per cent of the
extension insurance sold in Saskatchewan is effected through SGIO.
In this area SGIO pays agency commissions equivalent to those paid
by other insurance companies in Canada, and it may be that its
expense figures are not very different from those of equivalent companies in Saskatchewan. These figures are very difficult to ascertain
with any degree of reliability because of the arbitrary allocation necessary in their determination. According to SGIO figures, its expenses
in extension insurance amounted to 84.8% of its premium income
in 1960. Its losses amounted to 65.8% of its premium income, resulting
in a net loss for the year of 0.6%.5 These figures compare with the
Dominion Board Automobile Committee's estimate that expenses
should constitute 34.5%, losses 63%, and profit or surplus 2.5% of
premium income.6 The Quebec ratings from 1950 to 1953 were based
5. THE SASKATCHEWAN GOVERNMENT INSURANCE OFFICE, ANNUAL REPORT 19-21
(1960).
6. REPORT OF REsTrICTIVE TRADE PRACTICES COMMISSION CONCERNING AUTO-
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on an expense experience of 42% and a loss experience of 55.5%;
Ontario ratings in 1948 used an expense per cent of 44.5 and losses of
53%. In both cases there was a 2.5% surplus.7 These figures are not
exactly equivalent because SGIO accounting includes all adjustment
costs in expenses, whereas the common practice in other companies
is to include them in the losses figure. A highly dramatic difference
is shown if these figures are compared with the experience of SGIO
under the Part II and compulsory portions of its coverage in the
fifteen-year period from 1946 to 1961. In this period expenses
amounted to 16.79%, losses to 75.17%, and reserves and surplus to
8.04% of premium income,
In this area of extension insurance, then, SGIO is in no different
position from that of any independent private company except as
far as savings may result from its monopolistic operation in other
categories. Questions of fault arise in Saskatchewan as frequently as
in other parts of North America, whether between different insurance
companies or between an insurance company and an uninsured individual. The fault question also arises beyond the limits of whatever extension insurance happens to have been written. In extension
insurance, all of the companies operating in Saskatchewan employ
a deterrent feature by increasing rates in successive years after an
accident in which the insured was at fault. They do it in a rather inelegant way, without much attention to the degree of fault or the
seriousness of the accident.
ADMINISTRATION OF THE SCHEME

There can be little doubt that great savings are involved in writing
up costs under Part II and under the compulsory, comprehensive, and
liability categories. Less visible but logically to be expected is a saving
in the adjustment costs through the removal of any question of fault
from the greatest part of this area. A further explanation of the very
low expense figure under these categories may lie in the adjustment
savings in the area of Part II, for there the amounts payable are set
out with more clarity and certainty than elsewhere in the field of
personal injury. This saving arises only in Part II, because under
comprehensive and public liability insurance the common law approach to assessment of damages is retained.
Discussions with adjusters in SGIO aroused some suspicions of
inadequacy in the Saskatchewan administration. First, it was apparent
that one of the objectives of the adjusters was to keep the insured, or
rather the claimant, from seeing a lawyer. They tended to rationalize
MOBILE INSURANCE IN CANADA

165 (1960).

7. Id. at 163.
8. Figures supplied by SGIO.
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this on the ground that lawyers create unnecessary trouble and expense, but they did not completely conceal the feeling that a quicker
and lower settlement was obtained in the absence of a lawyer. Second,
accompanying this objective there was a distinct feeling on the part
of some that public adjusters could perform a very valuable function
in Saskatchewan by acting on behalf of claimants. Third, a similar
difficulty arises out of the confusion in the minds of claimants because
of the various functions of an adjuster, who handles the Part II, comprehensive, public liability, and extension insurance at one and the
same time. The adjuster may be in a difficult conflict-of-interest position in getting full releases from claimants in these situations and
in obtaining agreements as to liability and degrees of negligence among
the various parties. This would be especially true if only one of the
two parties to an accident had an extension policy with SGIO and
the adjuster was therefore encouraged to exaggerate the extent of
the negligence of the other party.
One completely indefensible technique introduced in 1960 for
settling disputes as to the extent of disabilities under Part II deserves
mention. Under this amendment, in the event of a dispute between
the insurer and the claimant, the insurer is given the right to appoint
a medical examiner, whose decision "shall be conclusive." 9 The theoretical dangers of allowing one party to appoint a sole and final judge
in a dispute are too obvious to require further elaboration. It was
interesting to find this indefensible position defended - by persons
practically involved - by the serious statement that the office had
found that some doctors did and others did not understand the workings of the act. Their humor in expressing the matter in this way
was completely unconscious.
Fault is retained in a most unfortunate way in all portions of
automobile insurance in Saskatchewan. The driver without a license
and the owner without a registration certificate are treated as not
having insurance instead of being penalized in an appropriate fashion
for non-payment of compulsory premiums. Similarly, certain types
of conduct, notably driving while one's faculties are impaired by alcohol, produce a complete removal of insurance benefits. This is a
most illogical punishment for undesirable conduct, since the extent
of the punishment is predicated not on the conduct itself but on the
resultant damage to persons and property. With no difference in the
immorality or undesirability of the conduct, punishment may range
from nothing to hundreds of thousands of dollars. In addition to the
theoretical arguments against such arbitrariness, the adjusters in the
field report public dismay over it in almost all cases, resulting in
9. Rav. STAT. SASK. ch. 371, §20 (1953), as amended, STAT. SAsK. ch. 15, §20 (8)
(1960).
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pressure on them not to apply the law in its full rigor.
A similar difficulty arises in the lack of coverage for gratuitous
passengers beyond the Part II compensation when the driver was at
10
fault, unless he was guilty of "wanton and willful misconduct."
These minor matters should be attended to in order to achieve a
more just and satisfying result, but they in no way affect the over-all
advantages of the scheme, especially in its most important portionPart II.
It is a monumental if not impossible task to compare accurately
rates and losses and expenses and profits of companies or jurisdictions.
Even if the variations in accounting methods could be allowed for,
there would remain too many variables in the risks covered to permit
a clear picture. The differences in Canada's three prairie provinces
would not lead one to expect great variations in the risk picture. But
a few figures synthesized from the reports of the Dominion Bureau
of Statistics 1 show the following strange picture for 1958:

Sask.
Man.
Alta.

Vehicles
Registered

Gallons of
Gasoline
Sold

Accidents

Deaths

Injured

314,000
256,000
430,000

287,000,000
226,000,000
442,000,000

11,351
11,701
21,045

134
125
205

4,113
4,383
5,201

Property
Damage
$4,892,000
4,272,000
8,509,000

The Saskatchewan loss figures are low, whether calculations are
based on number of vehicles or on gasoline consumption. The Alberta figures run high. This is emphasized by the 1949-58 averages
for deaths from automobile accidents in the three provinces. The
figures per 10,000 vehicles are Saskatchewan 4.7, Manitoba 6, Alberta
7.
If comparisons are of small avail, resort must be had to logical
expectations. The first of these, that a compulsory plan operated as
a monopoly would allow great savings in writing up costs, is amply
demonstrated by cost comparisons. A second logical expectation is
that the removal of questions of fault, thereby eliminating difficult
conflicts and litigation, would produce further savings. Finally, the
use of a schedule of compensation such as that contained in Part II
would save adjustment costs by eliminating the uncertainty of the
common law approach. The last two savings are amply illustrated in
Saskatchewan by the adjusters' frank appraisals of situations and by
the decline of litigation in this field. Certainly, Saskatchewan courts
are occupied with these questions far less than sixty per cent of the
time, which is the percentage asserted for all of Canada.12 It is true
10. In Saskatchewan gross negligence no longer suffices. STAT. SASK. ch. 93,
§157 (2) (1957).
11. DOMINION BuREAu OF STATISTIcs, CANADA YEAR BOOK 834, 839-40 (1960).
12. Wright, The Adequacy of the Law of Torts, VI J. Soc. PuB. T.L. 11, 18

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol14/iss4/3

8

Lang:
The Nature andOF
Potential
of theLAW
Saskatchewan
UNIVERSITY
FLORIDA
REVIEWInsurance Experiment
that frank appraisals and diminution of litigation could be gained
without compulsion or monopoly by introducing legislation adopting
strict liability in this field and by introducing a schedule of damages
of impersonal nature in place of the present personalized assessments.
There would be some increase in adjustment expense if several
companies were involved in insuring, but the greatest cost increase
would lie in writing up the insurance. It is this that leads to the conclusion that automobile insurance, like the post office, should be a
natural state monopoly.
THE THEORY iN SUPPORT OF PART II

The economics involved might be sufficient to justify Part II even
at the cost of some inelegance of legal theory. On the contrary, however, legal theory supports the Part II approach. The argument, pursued in greater detail elsewhere, 13 depends, in the first place, upon the
view that negligence and fault, with their moral overtones, were bad
theology and novel law. Not only are negligence and fault expensive
and almost impossible to determine but their moral overtones were
early eliminated by using objective tests in lieu of inquiries into subjective intentions. Consequently, minor differences in types of conduct
do not result in appropriate penalties by way of special premiums, as
they should; instead, they result in a shifting of large liabilities.
Second, individuals ought to pay for the risks inherent in their
actions; and acting reasonably should not relieve them, because that
simply means that the risk was worth taking. Those who drive automobiles ought to bear the risk of all injuries, because the risk, even
in pure accidents, flows naturally from their activity.
Third, in view of the possibility of insolvency, only insurance can
always guarantee the payment of the costs of this activity. Hence insurance should be compulsory.
Fourth, insurance is extremely desirable, and compulsory monopoly
insurance makes it available at such low cost that the elimination of
freedom not to insure is justified.
Fifth, impersonal schedules of damages further reduce the cost
of insuring by introducing certainty into assessment. The schedules
should be composed of minimum amounts based on the normal needs
of the injured person or his dependents. This will result in lower
coverage than that required under the assessment procedures used
in North America today, but the only real saving is in the cost of
reaching agreement as to the amount of compensation. The saving
(1961).
13.

See Lang, The Activity-Risk Theory of Tort: Risk, Insurance and Insol-

vency, 39 Can. B. Rev. 530 (1961).
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resulting from the lower coverage will be expended by the insured
for such insurance as he may require to supplement the basic coverage of the scheme. This additional coverage, open to free competition,
is specific arrangement insurance with the schedule of compensation
set by contractual agreement; therefore, it is also free from the difficulty of "assessing damages." This shifting of part of the potential
risk from actors to victims can be justified by the universality of the
benefits of the activity. This system guarantees that each person gains
more as actor than he loses as victim. Additionally, there is the social
argument that those with special income interests to be protected can
properly be asked to protect themselves out of that income. Each person ought to give and receive average protection. If, for example, a
person has been endowed with especially valuable income-producing
hands, the risk of loss of the value of his hands in excess of the value
of average hands is a proper burden for him to bear. The fortunate
person ought to bear this risk gladly and not expect to be able to
shift it to less fortunate individuals.
The fixed minimum schedules, in addition to the saving resulting
from their application, may have a further practical value in that
by leaving a very large field open to the insurance companies, they
lessen the powerful opposition from these companies to the introduction of a Part II scheme.
Even in Saskatchewan, where contingency fees are unethical, it is
obvious that removing the fault and damages questions eliminates a
large part of the cost of employing lawyers. The saving in jurisdictions in which contingency fees exist should be greater, and accordingly selfish opposition from some members of the legal profession
may be expected.
IMPROVING THE SASKATCHEWAN SCHEME

Several of the administrative imperfections in the Saskatchewan
scheme have already been noted. These could be eliminated with little
difficulty. The most serious limitations are the narrowness of Part II
and the retention beyond Part II of questions of fault and problems
of damages. A significant extension of the ambit of Part II took
effect April 1, 1953,14 and others may be expected. Whatever these
extensions may be, there is as yet no indication of a readiness to
destroy all liability in excess of the Part II payments.
A much more fundamental change in thinking would be required
to impose the costs of increasing risks more exactly upon those who
are responsible for them. An obvious improvement would be to base
a part of the premium load upon mileage traveled, although to do
14.

REv. STAT. SASK. ch. 371, §§20-23 (1953).
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this with complete exactness is impossible. However, making a gasoline tax part of the premium income of SGIO would be a substantial
improvement over the present situation.
Even more fundamental is the realization that variations in conduct on the highway, as well as variations in driving ability, seriously
affect the risks of damage and injury. In each case there should be an
examination of the extent of the increase in risk and a determination
of whether an appropriate extra charge could be made, considering
the value of the deterrent effect and the cost of collection. In Saskatchewan, as well as in most jurisdictions, deviations from a standard
of conduct in driving are treated as quasi-criminal offenses. Yet the
most important aspect of the deviation lies in the increase in the risk
of causing damage. Hence such matters as speeding and ignoring stop
signs should be treated as civil matters between the insurance office a monopoly under the proposed extended Part II- and the insured.
The fine should be a premium assessment fixed to cover as nearly as
possible both the increase in risk and a part of the collection
costs. Because the matter is obviously civil in nature, the proper
burden of proof should be by a mere balance of probabilities,
and the stigma of criminal offense should disappear. 15 When these
assessments are viewed as the price properly payable for specific
conduct, it becomes possible to conceive of engaging part-time collectors. The best drivers might be paid mileage commissions in return
for reporting conduct deviations, and indeed they might be equipped
with recording or radio devices. Perhaps only after several such reports would the individual be billed for his extra premium. Perhaps
better drivers, after passing strict tests, would be allowed greater latitude in conduct for the same basic premium. All of these variations
would depend on cost and income calculations, but a system of this
type would reintroduce sufficient and accurate deterrents and would
be a complete answer to those who fear their absence from Part II
schemes.
INTRODUCTION OF PART II IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS

The Part II idea is completely adaptable to every area of North
America. Saskatchewan does not have any characteristics that cause the
plan to work peculiarly well. Of course, its road and traffic patterns
result in lower rates, but the savings possible in other jurisdictions
would be proportionately as great and therefore much greater in
actual figures because of the higher rates. Indeed, because of both
the customary low charges by lawyers and the absence of contingency
15. Of course if the conduct is very dangerous and shows mens rea, an antisocial intention, it may properly remain in the sphere of the criminal law.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1962

11

Florida Law Review, Vol. 14, Iss. 4 [1962], Art. 3
THE SASKA TCHEWAN EXPERIMENT
fees in Saskatchewan, it may have been a particularly unfavorable area
in which to test the scheme.
Some conflicts problems will no doubt exist when more jurisdictions adopt the Part II approach. To avoid the use of fault as a test
for liability, the simple involvement of a vehicle in an accident should
result in equal involvement of the plan under which that vehicle is
registered. A better solution would be to include within one plan all
operators and vehicles operating within a specified area, especially if
the gasoline tax is used as a means of collecting premiums. The doctrine of lex loci delicti would limit all claims to the amount set out
in the area plan, with no additional tort liability imposed on any
operator. As long as other jurisdictions retained the present legal
approach to liability, the plan would have to cover the potential
liability of its drivers in those areas; and operators from other jurisdictions entering a state with such a plan would have to buy special
arrangement insurance at their points of entry.
SUM MARY

The Saskatchewan insurance plan has been an extremely successful
experiment. All of its basic ideas have not been completely implemented, but even so the savings have fully measured up to all logical
expectations. Fully developed, with all the kinks and defects removed,
it would be immensely valuable in other jurisdictions in North
America. The savings from the monopoly and the compulsory approach are great enough to make automobile insurance a desirable
monopoly; that is, those savings more than offset the losses resulting
from bureaucracy and government control.
Because of the broad area of specific arrangement insurance remaining to insurance company competition after implementation of
the full plan, the most serious effect upon the companies would be
the shift in type of business. Therefore, more practical opposition to
the scheme's implementation may be expected from those lawyers
who put self-interest above professional service.
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